Kyle Duncan – Nominee to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Kyle Duncan, nominated by President Trump to the Fifth Circuit, is an experienced Supreme Court advocate who has built a reputation by promoting conservative religious causes through litigation and advancing prosecution-friendly positions in criminal cases. In particular, Duncan has spent much of his recent career fighting to narrow protections for reproductive freedom and LGBT rights. While the Fifth Circuit is already a conservative court, Duncan’s confirmation would add a uniquely conservative perspective.

Background

Stuart Kyle Duncan was born in 1972 in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.[1] He graduated summa cum laude from Louisiana State University in 1994 and received his law degree in 1997 from the same institution, where he served on the Louisiana Law Review and was inducted into the Order of the Coif.[2] After receiving his J.D. in 1997, he clerked for Fifth Circuit Judge John M. Duhé, Jr., in Louisiana.[3] From 1998-2002 he had a series of relatively short stints in Texas as an associate working on appellate matters at Vinson & Elkins LLP in Houston; as Assistant Solicitor General in Austin; and as an associate at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP in Austin.[4] In 2002, he became an “Associate-in-Law” (preparing a teaching career) at Columbia Law School, receiving his L.L.M. from that institution in 2004.[5] He taught at the University of Mississippi School of Law from 2004-2008, then served as Appellate Chief (essentially the solicitor general)[6] for Louisiana’s AG’s office from 2008-2012.[7] After that he began what would become his most publicly notable work, serving from 2012-2014 as general counsel (leading the litigation team) for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty,[8] a “non-profit, public-interest legal and educational institute with a mission to protect the free expression of all faiths.”[9] He left Becket in 2014 to open up his own shop, Duncan PLLC, which today exists as Schaerr Duncan LLP, where he continues work “in the same genre” as he handled “while in government practice and at Becket–namely civil and criminal litigation, typically concerning federal constitutional issues and primarily, but not exclusively, at the appellate level.”[10]

Duncan is a member of the ABA’s Committee on the Relationship of the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches.[11] He is also a member of the Federalist Society (a conservative law and policy group whose membership has yielded numerous Trump nominees)[12] and of the Knights of Columbus,[13] “an international organization of nearly 2 million Catholic men whose principal work involves helping others in need.”[14]

Duncan was a poll watcher for Mitt Romney’s presidential campaign in 2012, and in 2016 he was a member of the religious liberty advisory board for Marco Rubio’s presidential campaign.[15]

History of the Seat

Duncan was nominated to a Louisiana seat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The seat opened up with Judge W. Eugene Davis’s move to senior status on December 31, 2016.  Because the seat opened up so late in the Obama Administration, no nominee was put forward until Duncan was nominated on October 2, 2017.

Legal Career

Duncan’s most notable representations in recent history have been in opposition to reproductive freedom and the rights of LGBT people. (Disclosure: In many of the cases cited below, the ACLU–for whom I work–was on the opposite side of the litigation.)

Since leaving the Becket Fund, Duncan has devoted considerable time in cases involving transgender rights. For example, Duncan represented a Virginia school board that refused to let transgender male student Gavin Grimm use the male restroom at school. The Supreme Court did not ultimately issue a merits determination in that case. Duncan also represented North Carolina’s speaker of the House and the president pro tem of the Senate in Carcaño v. McCrory, [16] a suit challenging North Carolina’s House Bill 2, which blocked transgender people from accessing restrooms and other facilities consistent with their gender identity and prevented local governments from protecting LGBT people from discrimination in a variety of settings, and HB 2’s replacement law, HB 142.

The plaintiffs in Carcaño, represented by the ACLU and Lambda Legal, contended among other things that denying transgender people access to restrooms consistent with their gender identity violates their rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses and Title IX.[17] In his intervention motion on his clients’ behalf, Duncan argued that the plaintiffs’ legal theory was  “radical” and “subjects every North Carolina female” using public facilities “to a heightened risk of sexual predation” by men falsely claiming to be women.[18] In the motion, Duncan also  repeatedly put quotation marks around words such as “woman” and “identify” and the phrase “gender identity.”[19] Despite Duncan’s characterization, the district judge, appointed by George W. Bush, entered a preliminary injunction as to the plaintiff’s Title IX claim,[20] in accordance with the increasing number of courts who are finding that similar restrictions preventing transgender students from accessing restrooms consistent with their gender identity violate Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause.[21]

Throughout the litigation, Duncan’s ultimate legal position–increasingly rejected by courts[22]–was that discrimination against transgender people is subject to the most lenient form of judicial review, rational-basis review. Moreover, Duncan rejects the application of the sex-stereotyping theory of sex discrimination (from the Supreme Court’s Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins case) to transgender people. At the preliminary-injunction hearing, Duncan argued that transgender women are not women and that transgender men are not men, and that laws like North Carolina’s don’t have anything to do with sex stereotypes. To Duncan, the cases applying Price Waterhouse to transgender people were those “where the discriminator has discriminated on the basis of mannerisms, or the appearance, the behavior of a person. Just to put it in plain terms, I’ve discriminated against a man because that man doesn’t act enough like a man,” or “[w]e don’t think a man should look like that.”[23] Duncan distinguishes North Carolina’s laws by saying that under those provisions, “[i]It doesn’t matter how you present as a man, it doesn’t matter how masculine you are, it doesn’t matter how high your voice it, it doesn’t matter. Men use the men’s bathroom. The same for women. That’s not sex stereotyping. That’s the opposite of sex stereotyping.”[24]

In addition to his work limiting transgender rights, Duncan has also fought the legal recognition of same-sex families. Duncan was counsel of record for the respondent in V.L. v. E.L., which concerned a lesbian couple’s second-parent adoption, which is an adoption by someone who is not the spouse of the child’s legal parent. (At the time of the adoption, V.L. could not legally marry biological mother E.L. in Alabama, but the two sought to raise their child together.) V.L. and E.L. secured the adoption in Georgia, but E.L. later tried to disrupt the arrangement by arguing that Alabama did not have to give full faith and credit to the Georgia court’s judgment. In his response to the cert petition, Duncan argued that the Georgia court lacked jurisdiction to grant the adoption, and therefore Alabama did not have to honor it.[25] Duncan criticized V.L. for “extravagantly” claiming that the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision “grossly deviates” from the Supreme Court’s full-faith-and-credit jurisprudence, and said she was overstating the harms that the Alabama court’s decision would cause.[26] Without granting oral argument, the Supreme Court summarily reversed in a unanimous decision, rejecting Duncan’s arguments, stating that under Georgia law, superior courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to decide “all matters of adoption,” and whatever the merits of the Georgia court’s judgment, that judgment was within that statutory grant of jurisdiction and had to be given full faith and credit.[27]

Perhaps Duncan’s most famous case was serving as party counsel to Hobby Lobby Stores and its owners in their eponymous challenge to the Affordable Care Act’s contraception mandate.[28] In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court struck down the requirement as to closely held corporations whose owners objected to providing contraceptive coverage on religious grounds.[29] Duncan’s subsequent forays into reproductive-freedom law included filing an amicus brief in the Supreme Court’s latest abortion case, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, on behalf of the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, Inc.,[30] and representing his former boss–the State of Louisiana–in its defense of a challenge to its requirement–not unlike the one struck down in Whole Woman’s Health–that doctors performing abortions have admitting privileges at a nearby hospital. In that case, June Medical Services, L.L.C. v. Gee, the district court entered a permanent injunction earlier this year barring enforcement of the law,[31] and the case is on appeal for the second time to the Fifth Circuit.[32] Rejecting the foundation of the purported purpose behind these laws–women’s safety–the district court noted in its final order that Duncan “did not introduce any evidence showing that patients have better outcomes when their physicians have admitting privileges,” nor did he “proffer evidence of any instance in which an admitting privileges requirement would have helped even one woman obtain better treatment.”[33] The court continued:

In conclusion, there is no credible evidence in the record that Act 620 would further the State’s interest in women’s health beyond that which is already insured under existing Louisiana law. Indeed, the overwhelming weight of the evidence demonstrates that, in the decades before the Act’s passage, abortion in Louisiana has been extremely safe, with particularly low rates of serious complications, and as compared with childbirth and with medical procedures that are far less regulated than abortion.

Act 620 would do very little, if anything, to advance women’s health and indeed would, by limiting access to legal abortions, substantially increase the risk of harm to women’s health by increasing the risks associated with self-induced or illegal and unlicensed abortions.[34]

This is only a small sample of the major statutory and constitutional disputes in which Duncan has been involved. He represented a muslim inmate in the Supreme Court in a successful religion-based challenge to a state prison system’s beard-length rules (Holt v. Hobbs),[35] represented amici National Sheriffs’ Association and others in challenging President Obama’s DAPA order (Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents) (United States v. Texas),[36] represented several state amici in contending that the Sixth Amendment does not require criminal defendants to be apprised of the collateral deportation consequences of a guilty plea (Padilla v. Kentucky),[37] represented several state amici in opposing marriage for same-sex couples (Obergefell v. Hodges),[38] represented the State of North Carolina in filing an unsuccessful cert petition attempting to overturn a Fourth Circuit ruling finding that the state violated the Voting Rights Act in making changes in election laws to target Black voters (North Carolina v. North Carolina State Conf. of the NAACP),[39] represented the State of Louisiana in unsuccessfully contending that Miller v. Alabama (prohibiting mandatory life sentences without parole for juvenile offenders) was not retroactive on state collateral review (Montgomery v. Louisiana),[40] successfully represented Louisiana in overturning a multi-million-dollar jury award against a prosecutor (Connick v. Thompson)[41], and supervised the representation of a Jewish prison inmate seeking a kosher diet (Rich v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corrections, in the Eleventh Circuit),[42] among others.

Speeches/Writings

Duncan has been a prolific public commentator, and his views in the public sphere track those made in the courtroom. Indeed, most of Duncan’s writing is directed at litigation. He has written on Hobby Lobby (contraception),[43] Zubik (contraception),[44] Trinity Lutheran (religious funding),[45] Windsor and Obergefell (marriage for same-sex couples),[46] and others.

Duncan has written and spoken most often on the contraception mandate.[47] He predicted that the Affordable Care Act’s contraception mandate “could lead to future mandates that could encompass all manner of controversial practices from surgical abortion to euthanasia to sex-change surgery.”[48] Duncan also complained that the religious-employer exemption does not go far enough:

Who doesn’t get the exemption? Organizations that undertake projects such as educating students, treating the sick or feeding the poor. Because these groups leave the cloister, the government now declares their consciences unworthy of protection.

This kind of religious quarantine is patently unconstitutional.

Animating these measures is a sinister form of “tolerance” that should make religious Americans shudder. It is a cast of mind that relegates the genuinely religious to the margins of polite society. It tolerates countercultural views on sexual morality — provided they are kept safely out of sight.[49]

On marriage, Duncan says that Obergefell “threatens civic peace” because it “marginalize[s] the view of millions of Americans at exactly the wrong time, when standards of civil discourse are rapidly degenerating and when Americans seem increasingly to be forgetting the value of a robust, free, and open exchange of ideas on controversial topics.”[50]

On public displays on religion, he criticizes “militant atheist” groups that insist on “scour[ing] public life of all religious references” or sponsoring deities like the Flying Spaghetti Monster when such “scour[ing]” is not an option.[51] (Disclosure: I am currently co-counseling an unrelated religious-freedom case with the organization Duncan criticizes in the cited piece.) Defending a city’s purported right to sponsor a nativity scene but permit no other religious displays, Duncan explains: “Any government doomed to give ‘equal time’ to objectors whenever it speaks would collapse into incoherence. The postal service couldn’t issue a stamp honoring Martin Luther King, Jr., without also honoring the Ku Klux Klan. The National Holocaust Museum would have to include the Joseph Goebbels Wing. Lincoln’s statue would have to stare at a Jefferson Davis Memorial.”[52]

Duncan has also written a number of law-review articles. For example, one criticizes Flast v. Cohen, which permitted taxpayer standing to challenge Establishment Clause violations.[53] One analyzes and defends Justice Scalia’s dissent in the Ten Commandments case, McCreary County.[54] Another promotes the idea of tying Establishment Clause jurisprudence to the principle of “subsidiarity”–a “theory about the relationship among social structures, the common good and human dignity with a venerable pedigree in European political thought”; the theory, as explained in the article, is highly complex but ultimately leads to the result of a states’-rights approach to establishment questions.[55] And one article criticizes barriers to public religious funding and seemingly laments Supreme Court decisions that have “scoured public schools of all formal religious practice.”[56]

Overall Assessment

Kyle Duncan is an experienced appellate litigator with highly significant successes in the Supreme Court and lower courts. Both through his academic writings on religion-clause jurisprudence and through his litigation, Duncan has established his views on religious freedom, reproductive freedom, and LGBT rights. While some nominees assert that their work in an AG or SG’s office is not relevant because they were merely representing their government client, the assiduousness and consistency of Duncan’s post-government work at Becket and in private practice suggest that his representations track his own views. If confirmed to the Fifth Circuit, he would likely be a strong voice for narrowing statutory and constitutional protections for reproductive freedom and LGBT rights, while expanding the leeway allowed for citizens making religious objections to a wide variety of laws.


[1] Stuart Kyle Duncan, Questionnaire for Judicial Nominees at 1, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Duncan%20SJQ1.pdf.

[2] Stuart Kyle Duncan, Questionnaire for Judicial Nominees at 1, 4-5, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Duncan%20SJQ1.pdf.

[3] Stuart Kyle Duncan, Questionnaire for Judicial Nominees at 1, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Duncan%20SJQ1.pdf.

[4] Stuart Kyle Duncan, Questionnaire for Judicial Nominees at 2-3, 32, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Duncan%20SJQ1.pdf.

[5] Stuart Kyle Duncan, Questionnaire for Judicial Nominees at 1-2, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Duncan%20SJQ1.pdf.

[6] Stuart Kyle Duncan, Questionnaire for Judicial Nominees at 32, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Duncan%20SJQ1.pdf.

[7] Stuart Kyle Duncan, Questionnaire for Judicial Nominees at 2, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Duncan%20SJQ1.pdf.

[8] Stuart Kyle Duncan, Questionnaire for Judicial Nominees at 2, 32, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Duncan%20SJQ1.pdf.

[9] https://www.becketlaw.org/about-us/mission/.

[10] Stuart Kyle Duncan, Questionnaire for Judicial Nominees at 1-2, 32, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Duncan%20SJQ1.pdf.

[11] Stuart Kyle Duncan, Questionnaire for Judicial Nominees at 4, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Duncan%20SJQ1.pdf.

[12] https://fedsoc.org/.

[13] Stuart Kyle Duncan, Questionnaire for Judicial Nominees at 5, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Duncan%20SJQ1.pdf.

[14] http://www.kofc.org/un/en/todays-knights/what-we-do.html.

[15] Stuart Kyle Duncan, Questionnaire for Judicial Nominees at 30, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Duncan%20SJQ1.pdf.

[16] 1:16-cv-236-TDS-JEP (M.D.N.C.).

[17] https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/carcano-et-al-v-mccrory-et-al-complaint.

[18] ECF No. 34 at 2 (PDF p. 8), in 1:16-cv-236-TDS-JEP (M.D.N.C.)..

[19] ECF No. 34 at 2-3 (PDF pp. 8-9), in 1:16-cv-236-TDS-JEP (M.D.N.C.).

[20] ECF No. 127, in 1:16-cv-236-TDS-JEP (M.D.N.C.).

[21] E.g., Whitaker By Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017); Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267 (W.D. Pa. 2017); Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. United States Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850 (S.D. Ohio 2016).

[22] E.g., Stone v. Trump, No. CV MJG-17-2459, 2017 WL 5589122 (D. Md. Nov. 21, 2017); Doe 1 v. Trump, No. CV 17-1597 (CKK), 2017 WL 4873042 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2017); Adkins v. City of New York, 143 F. Supp. 3d 134 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); see also Whitaker By Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017); Evancho v. Pine-Richland Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267 (W.D. Pa. 2017); Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. United States Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 850 (S.D. Ohio 2016).

[23] ECF No. 103 at 87-88, in 1:16-cv-236-TDS-JEP (M.D.N.C.).

[24] ECF No. 103 at 89, in 1:16-cv-236-TDS-JEP (M.D.N.C.) (emphasis added).

[25] Resp. to Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 2-3 (PDF. pp. 11-12), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/15-648-Brief-in-Opposition.pdf.

[26] Resp. to Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 9, 12-14 (PDF. pp. 18, 21-23), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/15-648-Brief-in-Opposition.pdf.

[27] 136 S.Ct. 1017 (2016).

[28] Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).

[29] Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).

[30] http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/15-274-bsac-AAPS.pdf.

[31] ECF No. 274, in 3:14-cv-525-JWD-RLB (M.D. La.).

[32] No 17-30397 (5th Cir.).

[33] ECF No. 274 at 67 ¶ 230, in 3:14-cv-525-JWD-RLB (M.D. La.).

[34] ECF No. 274 at 70 ¶¶ 240, 242, in 3:14-cv-525-JWD-RLB (M.D. La.).

[35] Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015).

[36] 2016 WL 1377728.

[37] 2009 WL 2564713.

[38] 2015 WL 1608213.

[39] http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/16-833-cert-petition.pdf.

[40] 2015 WL 5064004.

[41] 563 U.S. 51 (2011).

[42] Stuart Kyle Duncan, Questionnaire for Judicial Nominees at 49, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Duncan%20SJQ1.pdf.

[43] https://www.religiousfreedominstitute.org/cornerstone/2016/6/30/hobby-lobby-spells-doom-for-mandate-20.

[44] https://www.schaerr-duncan.com/supplemental-briefs-in-zubik-v-burwell.

[45] https://www.schaerr-duncan.com/trinity-lutheran-church-v-pauley.

[46] https://www.schaerr-duncan.com/symposium-overruling-windsor; http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/04/14894/.

[47] Stuart Kyle Duncan, Questionnaire for Judicial Nominees at 6-7, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Duncan%20SJQ1.pdf.

[48] https://www.firstthings.com/article/2013/10/how-fares-religious-freedom.

[49] http://www.ncregister.com/daily-news/the-other-health-care-mandate-good-samaritan-turned-upside-down.

[50] Kyle Duncan, Obergefell Fallout, in Same-Sex Marriage: A Reference Handbook, 2nd Edition, at 132 (preview available on Google Books).

[51] https://www.schaerr-duncan.com/fighting-the-stupid-public-square.

[52] https://www.schaerr-duncan.com/fighting-the-stupid-public-square.

[53] Kyle Duncan, Misunderstanding Freedom from Religion: Two Cents on Madison’s Three Pence, 9 Nev. L.J. 32 (2008).

[54] Kyle Duncan, Bringing Scalia’s Decalogue Dissent Down from the Mountain, 2007 Utah L. Rev. 287 (2007).

[55] Kyle Duncan, Subsidiarity and Religious Establishments in the United States Constitution, 52 Vill. L. Rev. 67 (2007).

[56] Kyle Duncan, Secularism’s Laws: State Blaine Amendments and Religious Persecution, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 493, 497 (2003).

Allison Rushing – Nominee to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

At just 36 years old, Allison Jones Rushing is the youngest nominee Trump has put forward so far to an appellate seat.  While Rushing has a stellar resume, her youth will likely raise concerns in the confirmation process.

Background

Rushing was born Allison Blair Jones in Hendersonville, North Carolina in 1982.  She received a B.A. summa cum laude from Wake Forest University in 2002 and a J.D. magna cum laude from the Duke University School of Law in 2007.  As a law student, Rushing worked as a summer intern at the Alliance Defense Fund (ADF) (now Alliance Defending Freedom).[1]  ADF has drawn controversy for its advocacy involving “religious freedom” and has been labeled a hate group by the Southern Poverty Law Center.[2]

After graduating, Rushing clerked for then-Judge Neil Gorsuch on the Tenth Circuit, Judge David Sentelle on the D.C. Circuit, and for Justice Clarence Thomas on the U.S. Supreme Court, with a short stint as an Associate at Williams & Connolly in between.[3]

After her clerkships, Rushing rejoined the D.C. office of Williams & Connolly as an Associate.  In 2016, Rushing became a Partner at the firm, where she continues to serve.

History of the Seat

Rushing has been nominated to replace U.S. Circuit Judge Allyson Kay Duncan, who has indicated her intention to move to senior status upon the confirmation of her successor.  In June 2018, shortly after Duncan announced her departure, Rushing was contacted by the White House to gauge her interest in an appointment to the Fourth Circuit.[4]  After an interview, Rushing was informed by the White House that she would be nominated.[5]  Rushing was officially nominated on August 27, 2018.

Legal Experience

Other than her clerkships, Rushing has spent her legal career at the firm of Williams & Connolly, specifically focusing on appellate and commercial litigation.  Over the course of her career, Rushing has handled four trials in federal district court as well as over 47 briefs at the U.S. Supreme Court.[6]  In her litigation work, she has frequently collaborated with Williams & Connolly partner Kannon Shanmugam, himself a famous conservative attorney.

Among her more prominent clients, Rushing has represented the Bank of America corporation,[7] KPMG,[8] Ernst & Young,[9] and Eli Lilly.[10]  Rushing also represented Jesse Litvak, a bond trader convicted of securities fraud based on statements he had made during negotiations, on appeal, successfully reversing the convictions on the basis that Litvak’s misstatements were immaterial.[11]  Rushing also represented the New York City Council Black, Latino and Asian Caucus as amicus in a case involving New York City’s policy of preventing worship services in schools.[12]

Writings

As a law student, Rushing authored an article discussing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars lower federal courts from reviewing state court judgments.[13]  In the paper, Rushing outlines the doctrine, as well as changes to its contours in later decisions such as Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., which clarified that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar “parallel suits.”[14]

Political Activity & Membersips

Rushing has been a member of the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies since 2012.[15]  Rushing also served as a legal advisor in the Mitt Romney Presidential Campaign, to which she also donated $500.[16]

On the flip side, Rushing campaigned for Democratic Maryland Delegate Sam Arora, a former aide to Senator Hillary Clinton.[17]

Overall Assessment

With her hearing today, Rushing is on track to be the  youngest appellate judge confirmed since Alex Kozinski was appointed in 1985.  As such, it is likely that much of the debate around Rushing will revolve around her qualifications and experience.

While Rushing falls narrowly short of the American Bar Association’s twelve years of practice requirement, she was nonetheless rated “Qualified” by the group.[18]  This is likely a testament to Rushing’s substantial litigation experience, including extensive practice in the courts of appeals.

However, this does not mean that no questions can be raised about Rushing’s background.  Specifically, North Carolina lawyers might question Rushing’s connection with the court and the state that she will be serving.  While Rushing is a native North Carolinian, she has not practiced law in the state since law school, is not a member of the North Carolina bar, and, according to her firm biography, is not admitted to practice in the Fourth Circuit, the court to which she has been appointed.[19]

Given these factors and her relative youth, many will argue that there are many more qualified and experienced candidates for this vacancy.  However, the ultimate question around Rushing, as around any other nominee, is not whether she is the “most qualified” candidate, but rather, whether she meets the requisite levels of qualifications to be an appellate judge.  As Rushing’s intellect and legal ability are unquestioned, how senators vote will ultimately depend on which factors they consider in answering that question.


[1] Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Congress, Allison Jones Rushing: Questionnaire for Judicial Nominees 2.

[2] See Southern Poverty Law Center, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/alliance-defending-freedom (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).

[3] See Rushing, supra n. 1 at 2.

[4] Id. at 28.

[5] Id.

[6] Id. at 13-14.

[7] See United States ex rel. O’Donnell v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 3d 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).

[8] See Certain Funds, Accounts and/or Inv. Vehicles v. KPMG, LLP, 798 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2015).

[9] Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).

[10] See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Parenteral Medicines, Inc., 845 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2017).

[11] See United States v. Litvak, 889 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2018) and 808 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2015).

[12] The Bronx Household of Faith et al. v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of New York, 750 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2014).

[13] Allison B. Jones, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: What Does It Mean to be Inextricably Intertwined, 56 Duke L.J. 643 (Nov. 2006).

[14] Id. at 658-59.

[15] See Rushing, supra n. 1 at 5.

[17] See Rushing, supra n. 1 at 10.

[18] See American Bar Association, Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/Web%20rating%20Chart%20Trump%20115.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).

[19] See Williams & Connolly, Allison Rushing, https://www.wc.com/Attorneys/Allison-Jones-Rushing (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).

Judge Robert Summerhays – Nominee for the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

Like Dan Domenico and Dominic Lanza before him, Judge Robert Summerhays is a Trump district court nominee who was originally considered for the Court of Appeals.  While Summerhays was ultimately not selected for the Fifth Circuit (the Administration chose Kyle Duncan), he is now pending appointment to the Western District of Louisiana.

Background

Robert Rees Summerhays was born on September 10, 1965 in Fort Worth, Texas.  Summerhays attended the University of Texas at Austin, graduating with high honors in 1989, and then joined the U.S. General Accounting Office in Dallas as an evaluator.[1]

After two years in Dallas, Summerhays enrolled at the University of Texas at Austin Law School, graduating with high honors in 1994.[2]  He then clerked for Judge Eugene Davis on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.[3]  After his clerkship, Summerhays joined the Dallas office of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP as an associate.  In 2003, he became a partner at the firm.[4]

In 2006, Summerhays was named a Bankruptcy Judge on the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Louisiana.[5]  He still serves on that court today.  He also served as Chief Bankruptcy Judge from 2009 to 2017.[6]

History of the Seat

Summerhays has been nominated to fill a vacancy on the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.  The Western District is facing a vacancy crisis, with four of the seven allotted judgeships for the District currently vacant, and only two nominees pending.[7]  This crisis was exacerbated by the Republican Senate’s failure to confirm any Obama nominations to Louisiana seats in the 114th Congress.

The vacancy Doughty has been nominated to fill opened on June 5, 2017, when Judge Rebecca Doherty moved to senior status.  However, Summerhays was actually recommended by Louisiana senators Bill Cassidy and John Kennedy for appointment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit seat vacated by Judge Eugene Davis.[8]  In his interview with the White House, Summerhays expressed his willingness to take a District Court appointment if the White House chose not to nominate him for the Court of Appeals.[9]  Sure enough, the Trump Administration nominated conservative lawyer Kyle Duncan for the Fifth Circuit and tapped Summerhays for the Western District.

Legal Experience

After his clerkship, Summerhays joined the Dallas office of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, working in complex commercial litigation and securities litigation.[10]  Among the more prominent cases he handled at the time, Summerhays represented Ernst & Young in defending against a securities class actions suit, managing the litigation until the ultimate dismissal by Judge Sam Lindsay.[11]  He also represented the plaintiff in a state-law antitrust action against United Technologies Corporation, leading to a verdict for his client.[12]

Summerhays also handled many mediations, arbitrations, and other alternative dispositions.  Notably, he represented Hughes Electronics in a $1 Billion arbitration action against Boeing, guiding the case to a settlement.[13]

Jurisprudence and Reversals

Summerhays serves as a Bankruptcy Judge in the Western District of Louisiana.  In that capacity, Summerhays presides over bankruptcy matters, and has supervised 232 adversary proceedings and has entered final orders in over 16,000 cases.[14]  In his twelve years on the bench, three of his decisions were substantially reversed by higher courts:

In re Vidalier[15] – The district court reversed Summerhays’ ruling that a married debtor could not file late joint tax returns after the death of his spouse for years when the spouse was alive.[16]

Joyner v. Liprie[17] – This case involved an estate action brought by a former business partner that was removed to federal court.  Summerhays declined to remand the action to state court, ruling that the causes of action brought could not be asserted by the plaintiff.[18]  The District Court declined to adopt this portion of the report, remanding the action to state court.[19]

In re Miller[20] – In this case, Summerhays ruled that 11 U.S.C. § 1325 prevented a creditor from seeking an unsecured deficiency claim.[21]  The Fifth Circuit reversed this ruling.[22]

Writings

As a young attorney, Summerhays authored an article discussing the scope of Corporate Attorney-Client privilege.[23]  In the article, Summerhays criticizes the Fifth Circuit decision in Garner v. Wolfinbarger, which created an exception to attorney-client privilege in suits where corporate shareholders were suing management in derivative suits.[24]  Summerhays notes that the “doctrinal underpinnings of the Garner exception are frustratingly ambiguous.”[25]  He also criticizes the expansion of Garner to cover non-derivative suits and suits against majority shareholders.[26]  Instead, he proposes limiting Garner only to suits where shareholders are seeking to vindicate either rights common to all shareholders or rights of the corporations.[27]  Judge James “Jimbo” Stephens ultimately ruled that Doughty was not required to recuse himself from the case.[28]

Overall Assessment

Unlike fellow nominee Michael Juneau, who faced significant opposition in the Senate Judiciary Committee, Summerhays should face a relatively easy confirmation for three reasons.  First, Summerhays has extensive experience with complex litigation including arbitrations and mediations, a good skill set for a federal trial judge.  Second, Summerhays has a long and uncontroversial record on the bench, including a very low rate of reversal.  Finally, Summerhays lacks a controversial paper trail and has managed not to offend any key judicial stakeholders.

As such, it is likely that Summerhays will be confirmed by this summer, adding another Trump appointment onto the Western District of Louisiana.


[1] Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong., Robert Summerhays: Questionnaire for Judicial Nominees 2.

[2] Id. at 1.

[3] Id. at 2.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Tyler Bridges, 42 Parish Area of Western Louisiana Suffers From Vacant Federal Judgeships, The Acadiana Advocate, Aug. 22, 2017, http://www.theadvocate.com/acadiana/news/article_dad54e68-8791-11e7-9cfc-678529cbf1c6.html.

[8] See Summerhays, supra n. 1 at 56.

[9] Id.

[10] See Summerhays, supra n. 1 at 44.

[11] In re Capstead Mortg. Secs. Litig., 258 F. Supp. 2d 533 (N.D. Tex. 2003).

[12] Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp. v. United Tech. Corp., No. 95-CI-12541 (Bexas County, Tex. filed 1995).

[13] Boeing-Hughes Electronics Purchase Price Arbitration.

[14] See Summerhays, supra n. 1 at 14.

[15] 2006 WL 3873268 (Bankr. W.D. La. Dec 22, 2006), rev’d, 2008 WL 4003671 (W.D. La. Aug. 29, 2008).

[16] See id.

[17] 2012 WL 1144614 (Bankr. W.D. La. Apr. 04, 2012), report and recommendation adopted in part, rejected in part, Joyner v. S.F.L. & S.I.L., 485 B.R. 538 (W.D. La. 2013).

[18] See id.

[19] See id.

[20] No. 07-20542 (Bankr. W.D. La. Jan. 24, 2008), rev’d, 570 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2009).

[21] See id.

[22] See id.

[23] Robert R. Summerhays, The Problematic Expansion of the Garner v. Wolfinbarger Exception to the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 31 Tulsa L.J. 275 (Winter 1995).

[24] Id. at 286.

[25] See id. at 302.

[26] See id.

[27] Id. at 315.

[28] Id.

Judge Charles Barnes Goodwin – Nominee to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma

The Federal Courthouse in Lawton, Oklahoma

Judge Charles Goodwin was the first Trump nominee to receive a rating of unqualified from the American Bar Association.  Goodwin’s rating is particularly unusual, because, unlike the other two district court nominees who received the rating, Goodwin has been in practice for twenty years, and has served as a federal magistrate judge for the last four years.

Background

Goodwin has deep Oklahoma ties.  Charles Barnes Goodwin was born in Clinton, OK in 1970 to Charles L. and Nancy Goodwin.  His father, Charles L. “Buzz” Goodwin had served as a city councilman, city attorney, and mayor of Clinton before becoming elected as a state judge.[1]  Goodwin attended the University of Oklahoma, graduating with a B.A. in Letters and Economics in 1994.  He then attended the University of Oklahoma Law School, graduating in 1997.

After graduating, Goodwin served as a law clerk to then U.S. Magistrate Judge Claire Egan on the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma.[2]  He then served as a law clerk to Judge Lee West on the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.  In 2000, Goodwin joined the Oklahoma City office of Crowe & Dunleavy as an Associate.  In 2006, he became a Shareholder-Director.

In 2013, Goodwin became a federal magistrate judge on the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.  He currently serves in that capacity.

History of the Seat

The seat Goodwin has been nominated for opened on July 14, 2015, with Judge Robin Cauthron’s move to senior status.  While Cauthron moved to senior status with a year and a half left in the Obama Administration, no nominee was ever submitted for the vacancy.

Goodwin applied to fill the vacancy on November 30, 2016, shortly after the election of Donald Trump.[3]  After interviews with Oklahoma Senators James Inhofe and James Lankford, as well as with the White House and the Department of Justice, Goodwin was selected as a nominee in April 2017.  Goodwin was officially nominated on July 13, 2017, almost exactly two years to the day the vacancy opened.

Political Activity

Goodwin has a relatively short record of political activity.  He donated $500 to John McCain’s presidential campaign in 2008 and $1500 to Mitt Romney’s campaign in 2012.[4]  Additionally, he provided informal legal advice to the campaign of Ryan Leonard, a Republican running unsuccessfully for Oklahoma Attorney General in 2010.

In 2010, Goodwin applied to Democratic Governor Brad Henry for an appointment to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.[5]  However, Goodwin was not selected as one of the finalists for the seat and Henry appointed Oklahoma County District Judge Noma Gurich instead.[6]

Legal Experience

After stints as a law clerk for Judges Eagan and West, Goodwin joined Crowe & Dunleavy to work in commercial litigation.  In this capacity, Goodwin appeared in both state and federal court in securities, antitrust, fraud, contract, and class action cases.  Among the more significant matters he handled, Goodwin represented Duoyuan Global Water, Inc. in defending against a securities class action.[7]

In another matter, Goodwin represented 400 Oklahoma poultry farmers in a class action alleging violations of the Packers and Stockyards Act.[8]  After the district court granted summary judgment against Goodwin’s clients, he successfully argued for the ruling’s reversal from the Tenth Circuit.[9]  Goodwin then successfully defended the jury verdict for his clients before the Tenth Circuit,[10] and the Supreme Court.[11]

Jurisprudence

Goodwin has served as a U.S. Magistrate Judge on the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma since 2013.  In this role, Goodwin presides over pretrial, trial, grand jury and discovery matters.

Benefits Cases

Goodwin has frequently heard appeals from denials of social security benefits by administrative law judges (ALJ).  In many of these cases, Goodwin has affirmed the denial of benefits.[12]  However, Goodwin has just as frequently reversed in favor of claimants.[13]  In one notable case, Goodwin found that the ALJ failed to consider the role of the plaintiff’s mental health defects on his disability.[14]  In another case, Goodwin found that the ALJ had failed to consider the role of the plaintiff’s obesity on his disability.[15]  However, the district court declined to follow Goodwin’s recommendation, finding that the ALJ had correctly decided the case.[16]

Civil Rights Suits

As a U.S. Magistrate Judge, Goodwin frequently offers the preliminary recommendations on civil rights suits filed by prisoners and others under §1983.  In almost every single suit he has reviewed, Goodwin has recommended rejection of the plaintiff’s claims.[17]  While Goodwin’s recommendations have generally been accepted by the district courts, they have been rejected in some cases.[18]  In one case, Goodwin recommended the dismissal of a civil rights claim based on denial of medical care to an inmate.[19]  Specifically, he ruled that there was no allegation of knowledge by the defendant medical administrator of the lack of care.[20]  In rejecting the recommendation, the district judge found that the administrator’s knowledge could be assumed.[21]  In another case, the district judge declined to adopt Goodwin’s conclusion that the plaintiff had failed to properly exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing the suit.[22]

Overall Assessment

On paper, Charles Goodwin is a well-qualified candidate for the federal bench.  However, it’s impossible to discuss Goodwin’s qualifications without addressing the elephant in the room: his Unqualified rating from the ABA.

Generally, the ABA identifies three criteria that are key in its evaluation: integrity, professional competence and judicial temperament.[23]  While the ABA has been criticized for using an additional ideological test to downgrade conservative candidates, there are plenty of examples of the ABA highly rating conservative candidates, including the highest Well Qualified ratings for Fifth Circuit nominees Don Willett, James Ho, and Kyle Duncan.  At any rate, while Goodwin’s judicial record is conservative, it is not unusually so.

Instead, the ABA, in a Dec. 12th letter, explained that its criteria was Goodwin’s “work ethic.”  Specifically, ABA Standing Committee past Chair Nancy Deegan noted that “Magistrate Judge Goodwin’s work habits, including his frequent absence from the courthouse until mid-afternoon” raised concerns.  Deegan went on to note that “no issues were noted regarding Magistrate Judge Goodwin’s judicial temperament, intellectual capacity, writing and analytical abilities, knowledge of the law, or breadth of professional experience.”

Setting aside the ABA rating, there is little in Goodwin’s record that would disqualify him from the federal bench.  As such, Goodwin’s confirmation turns on how concerning senators find his work ethic.


[1] Obituary, Charles L. “Buzz” Goodwin, The Oklahoman, Nov. 13, 2017, http://legacy.newsok.com/obituaries/oklahoman/obituary.aspx?pid=187223226.  

[2] Eagan was nominated to a lifetime appointment by President George W. Bush and confirmed in 2001.

[3] Senate Judiciary Questionnaire, Charles Goodwin 50, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Goodwin%20SJQ.pdf.

[5] See Michael McNutt, Askins Seeks Seat on State’s High Court, The Oklahoman, Nov. 23, 2010.

[6] Tim Talley, Henry Names Noma Gurich to Okla. Supreme Court, Deseret News, Jan. 7, 2011, https://www.deseretnews.com/article/700098729/Henry-names-Noma-Gurich-to-Okla-Supreme-Court.html.

[7] See Ho v. Duoyuan Global Water, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).

[8] See Jim Stafford, Appeals Court Reinstates Farmers’ Lawsuit, The Oklahoman, Aug. 1, 2007.

[9] See Been et al. v. OK Indus., Inc., 495 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2007).

[10] Been v. OK Indus., Inc., 398 F. App’x 382 (10th Cir. 2010).

[11] OK Indus., Inc. v. Been, 563 U.S. 975 (2011) (denying certiorari).

[12] See, e.g., Packer v. Colvin, No. CIV-15-655-CG, 2016 WL 6770271 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 15, 2016); Hall v. Colvin, No. CIV-15-105-CG, 2016 WL 5239832 (W.D. Okla. Sep. 22, 2016).  See also Austin v. Colvin, No. CIV-13-1089-L, 2015 WL 631065 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 12, 2015); Stringer v. Colvin, No. CIV-13-1053-HE, 2014 WL 6879083 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 4, 2014); Payne v. Colvin, No. CIV-13-650-R, 2014 WL 4929434 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 29, 2014); Salazar v. Colvin, No. CIV-13-878-F, 2014 WL 4668794 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 18, 2014); Thompson v. Colvin, No. CIV-13-744-R, 2014 WL 4660805 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 17, 2014); Keeling v. Colvin, No. CIV-13-498-M, 2014 WL 4388411 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5, 2014); Devers v. Colvin, No. CIV-12-1285-D, 2014 WL 1272108 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 27, 2014); Humphreys v. Colvin, No. CIV-13-0098-HE, 2014 WL 1270748 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 25, 2014).

[13] See, e.g., Thompson v. Colvin, No. CIV-13-922-F, 2015 WL 586298 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 11, 2015); Johnson v. Colvin, No. CIV-13-871-R, 2014 WL 7187050 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 16, 2014); Hendrix v. Colvin, No. CIV-13-522-M, 2014 WL 4929427 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 30, 2014); Omes v. Colvin, No. CIV-13-375-HE, 2014 WL 4674364 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 29, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-13-0375-HE, 2014 WL 4674342 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 17, 2014); Shortnacy v. Colvin, No. CIV-13-297-HE, 2014 WL 4716075 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 26, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-13-0297-HE, 2014 WL 4716055 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 22, 2014); Cook v. Colvin, No. CIV-13-211-HE, 2014 WL 4209574 (W.D. Okla. July 30, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-13-0211-HE, 2014 WL 4209576 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 25, 2014); Williams v. Colvin, No. CIV-13-448-R, 2014 WL 2949470 (W.D. Okla. June 27, 2014); Robles v. Colvin, No. CIV-13-378-CG, 2014 WL 2219230 (W.D. Okla. May 29, 2014); Iles v. Colvin, No. CIV-13-0221-F, 2014 WL 1330010 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 31, 2014); Moore v. Colvin, No. CIV-13-60-M, 2014 WL 1344582 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 31, 2014); Hull v. Colvin, No. CIV-13-67-D, 2014 WL 1343502 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 31, 2014); Henderson v. Colvin, No. CIV-13-168-M, 2014 WL 1270978 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 26, 2014); Elix ex rel. JE v. Colvin, No. CIV-13-0139-HE, 2014 WL 903176 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 7, 2014); Pennington v. Colvin, No. CIV-12-1026-F, 2014 WL 869292 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 5, 2014); Redman v. Colvin, No. CIV-12-1039-R, 2014 WL 652314 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 19, 2014); Crowell v. Colvin, No. CIV-12-1126-L, 2013 WL 6800821 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 20, 2013).

[14] McClaflin v. Colvin, No. CIV-14-1128-CG, 2016 WL 5390908 (W.D. Okla. Sep. 27, 2016).

[15] Sanders v. Colvin, No. CIV-14-799-R, 2015 WL 5559868 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 18, 2015), report and recommendation rejected, No. CIV-14-799-R, 2015 WL 5559872 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 21, 2015).

[16] Sanders v. Colvin, No. CIV-14-799-R, 2015 WL 5559872 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 21, 2015).

[17] See, e.g., Alfred v. Alfred, No. CIV-17-273-C, 2017 WL 4563889, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-17-273-C, 2017 WL 4563062 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 12, 2017); Daly v. Gossen, No. CIV-15-13-C, 2017 WL 1051176, at *9 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 16, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-15-13-C, 2017 WL 1051140 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 20, 2017); Collins v. Payne Cty., No. CIV-15-1294-R, 2016 WL 7634475, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 30, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-15-1294-R, 2017 WL 31427 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 3, 2017); Tuell v. Kingfisher Cty., No. CIV-16-86-D, 2016 WL 7414597, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 30, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-16-86-D, 2016 WL 7410738 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2016); Blackburn v. Reeve, No. CIV-15-359-F, 2016 WL 3944940, at *1 (W.D. Okla. June 23, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-15-0359-F, 2016 WL 3945831 (W.D. Okla. July 19, 2016); Beals v. Elk City Police Dep’t, No. CIV-15-195-C, 2016 WL 3573241, at *1 (W.D. Okla. May 31, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-15-195-C, 2016 WL 3582152 (W.D. Okla. June 28, 2016); Barnett v. Sielert, No. CIV-14-1284-HE, 2016 WL 3802678, at *6 (W.D. Okla. May 31, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-14-1284-HE, 2016 WL 3829027 (W.D. Okla. July 12, 2016); Wilson v. Henry, No. CIV-15-1026-R, 2016 WL 3512035, at *4 (W.D. Okla. May 26, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-15-1026-R, 2016 WL 3523756 (W.D. Okla. June 22, 2016); Jordanoff v. Red Rock Adult Behavioral Health Ctr., No. CIV-15-846-R, 2016 WL 3561807, at *1 (W.D. Okla. May 11, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-15-846-R, 2016 WL 3566264 (W.D. Okla. June 27, 2016); Bishop v. Jester, No. CIV-14-678-C, 2016 WL 3526206, at *1 (W.D. Okla. May 11, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-14-678-C, 2016 WL 3546419 (W.D. Okla. June 23, 2016); Ray v. Dep’t of Corr., No. CIV-14-735-C, 2016 WL 1212773, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 2, 2016), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. JAMES PRESTON RAY, Plaintiff, vs. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants., No. CIV-14-735-C, 2016 WL 1228664 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 28, 2016); Coughlin v. Bear, No. CIV-15-536-R, 2016 WL 447345, at *6 (W.D. Okla. 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-15-536-R, 2016 WL 447744 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 4, 2016); Beals v. Webb, No. CV 15-194-C, 2015 WL 8654450, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 24, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-15-194-C, 2015 WL 8678409 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 11, 2015); Burghart v. O’Keefe, No. CIV-15-445-C, 2015 WL 9208842, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 30, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-15-445-C, 2015 WL 9095029 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 16, 2015); Kirbo v. Patton, No. CIV-15-583-W, 2015 WL 7294389, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 28, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-15-583-W, 2015 WL 7303553 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 18, 2015); Bishop v. Stewart, No. CIV-14-775-C, 2015 WL 7767264, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 16, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-14-775-C, 2015 WL 7779696 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 2, 2015); Barber v. Sutmiller, No. CIV-15-78-C, 2015 WL 5472508, at *3 (W.D. Okla. July 31, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-15-78-C, 2015 WL 5472940 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 17, 2015); Williams v. Cox, No. CIV-13-0971-F, 2015 WL 159053, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 8, 2015); Smith v. Jones, No. CIV-12-1365-HE, 2014 WL 5448890, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 23, 2014), aff’d, 606 F. App’x 899 (10th Cir. 2015); Darnell v. Jones, No. CIV-12-1065-M, 2014 WL 4792144, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 24, 2014), aff’d, 610 F. App’x 720 (10th Cir. 2015); Craft v. Glob. Expertise in Outsourcing, No. CIV-12-1133-R, 2014 WL 4699614, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 19, 2014), aff’d sub nom. Craft, Jr. v. Glob. Expertise in Outsourcing, 601 F. App’x 748 (10th Cir. 2015); Davis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. CIV-13-1174-HE, 2014 WL 4716332, at *1 (W.D. Okla. July 30, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-13-1174-HE, 2014 WL 4716209 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 22, 2014); Farris v. Frazier, No. CIV-12-1099-W, 2014 WL 3749142, at *2 (W.D. Okla. July 29, 2014), aff’d, 599 F. App’x 851 (10th Cir. 2015); Hill v. Cates, No. CIV-13-1126-D, 2014 WL 2865920, at *1 (W.D. Okla. June 24, 2014); Failes v. Garfield Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, No. CIV-13-0638-HE, 2014 WL 2712276, at *1 (W.D. Okla. June 16, 2014); Parkins v. Logan Cty., No. CIV-14-72-M, 2014 WL 2504517, at *1 (W.D. Okla. June 3, 2014); Free v. Stebens, No. CIV-13-14-F, 2014 WL 800915, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 28, 2014); Adams v. Sutmiller, No. CIV-10-920-F, 2014 WL 584749, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 12, 2014), aff’d sub nom. Adams v. Jones, 577 F. App’x 778 (10th Cir. 2014); Large v. Beckham Cty. Dist. Court, No. CIV-13-1276-F, 2014 WL 235477, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 22, 2014); Gray v. Ritter, No. CIV-11-1446-F, 2014 WL 37745, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 6, 2014); Gist v. Anderson, No. CIV-12-1208-HE, 2013 WL 6909470, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 30, 2013); Klein v. Gwinn, No. CIV-13-1207-HE, 2013 WL 6844276, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 27, 2013).  But see Savage v. Troutt, No. CIV-15-670-HE, 2016 WL 8711398, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 12, 2016), report and recommendation adopted as modified, No. CIV-15-0670-HE, 2016 WL 5107068 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 20, 2016) (recommending partial denial of defendant’s motion for summary judgment); Moore v. Pantoja, No. CIV-15-688-HE, 2016 WL 4493849, at *1 (W.D. Okla. July 26, 2016) (recommending denial of defendant’s motion for summary judgment); Young v. Rios, No. CIV-15-641-R, 2016 WL 1626609, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 10, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-15-641-R, 2016 WL 1611496 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 21, 2016).

[18] See, e.g., Williams v. Ormand, No. CIV-15-1288-HE, 2016 WL 6157651, at *1 (W.D. Okla. July 8, 2016), report and recommendation rejected, No. CIV-15-1288-HE, 2016 WL 6157429 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 21, 2016); Campbell v. Jones, No. CIV-13-926-R, 2015 WL 3971674, at *15 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 31, 2015), report and recommendation adopted in part, rejected in part, No. CIV-13-926-R, 2015 WL 3989137 (W.D. Okla. June 30, 2015); Jennings v. Dowling, No. CIV-14-335-C, 2015 WL 12915602, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 3, 2015), report and recommendation rejected, No. CIV-14-335-C, 2015 WL 12915603 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 31, 2015); Ford v. GEO Grp. Inc., No. CIV-13-1013-R, 2014 WL 4929443, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 8, 2014), report and recommendation rejected, No. CIV-13-1013-R, 2014 WL 4929334 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 30, 2014).

[19] Campbell v. Jones, No. CIV-13-926-R, 2015 WL 3971674 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 31, 2015).

[20] See id.

[21] Campbell v. Jones, No. CIV-13-926-R, 2015 WL 3971674, at *15 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 31, 2015), report and recommendation adopted in part, rejected in part, No. CIV-13-926-R, 2015 WL 3989137 (W.D. Okla. June 30, 2015).

[22] See Ford v. GEO Grp. Inc., No. CIV-13-1013-R, 2014 WL 4929443, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 8, 2014), report and recommendation rejected, No. CIV-13-1013-R, 2014 WL 4929334 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 30, 2014).

[23] American Bar Association Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary, What It Is and How It Works, at 3, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/scfedjud/federal_judiciary09.authcheckdam.pdf.

[24] Charlie Savage, Ratings Shrink President’s List for Judgeships, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/23/us/politics/screening-panel-rejects-many-obama-picks-for-federal-judgeships.html.  

Bending Blue Slips: Grassley’s Strategic Error

In the companion piece to this one, I discussed why Chairman Grassley’s changed stance on blue slips was motivated largely by political considerations rather than an actual pattern of obstruction.  In this piece, I discuss why the relaxation of blue slip standards is ultimately a strategic mistake for Grassley and judicial conservatives.

As I have noted before, the blue slip is an asymmetric weapon: i.e. it is not used comparably by both political parties.  Empirically, Republicans wield blue slips while Democrats yield them.

Let us look at the last forty years, from the Carter Administration to the Obama Administration.  This period covers three Democratic Administrations and three Republican Administrations (twenty years of each).  In those forty years, the following appellate nominees that were blocked due to the objections of home state senators:

During Democratic Administrations:

  • U.S. District Judge James A. Beaty – nominated in 1995 to the Fourth Circuit (blue slipped by Republican Sen. Jesse Helms)
  • U.S. Magistrate Judge J. Rich Leonard – nominated in 1995 to the Fourth Circuit (blue slipped by Republican Sen. Jesse Helms)
  • Judge Helene White of the Michigan Court of Appeals – nominated in 1997 to the Sixth Circuit (blue slipped by Republican Sen. Spencer Abraham)
  • Jorge C. Rangel – nominated in 1997 to the Fifth Circuit (blue slipped by Republican Sens. Phil Gramm and Kay Bailey Hutchison)
  • North Carolina Appeals Court Judge James Wynn – nominated in 1999 to the Fourth Circuit (blue slipped by Republican Sen. Jesse Helms)
  • Enrique Moreno – nominated in 1999 to the Fifth Circuit (blue slipped by Republican Sens. Phil Gramm and Kay Bailey Hutchison)
  • Kathleen McCree Lewis – nominated in 1999 to the Sixth Circuit (blue slipped by Republican Sen. Spencer Abraham)
  • James Lyons – nominated in 1999 to the Tenth Circuit (blue slipped by Republican Sen. Wayne Allard)
  • U.S. District Judge Robert Cindrich – nominated in 2000 to the Third Circuit (blue slipped by Republican Sen. Rick Santorum)
  • Victoria Nourse – nominated in 2010 for the Seventh Circuit (blue slipped by Republican Sen. Ron Johnson)
  • Steven Six – nominated in 2011 for the Tenth Circuit (blue slips returned but blocked upon request by Republican Sens. Pat Roberts and Jerry Moran)
  • Myra Selby – nominated in 2016 for the Seventh Circuit (blue slipped by Republican Sen. Dan Coats)
  • U.S. District Judge Abdul Kallon – nominated in 2016 for the Eleventh Circuit (blue slipped by Republican Sens. Richard Shelby and Jeff Sessions)
  • Justice Lisabeth Hughes – nominated in 2016 for the Sixth Circuit (blue slipped by Republican Sen. Mitch McConnell)
  • Rebecca Ross Haywood – nominated in 2016 for the Third Circuit (blue slipped by Republican Sen. Pat Toomey)

During Republican Administrations:

  • Stuart Summit – nominated in 1987 to the Second Circuit (processed by Judiciary Committee but blocked upon request of Sen. Alphonse D’Amato)
  • Stephen Murphy – nominated in 2006 to the Sixth Circuit (blue slipped by Democratic Sens. Carl Levin and Debbie Stabenow but ultimately confirmed to the District Court)
  • Shalom Stone – nominated in 2007 to the Third Circuit (blue slipped by Democratic Sens. Frank Lautenberg and Bob Menendez)
  • E. Duncan Getchell – nominated in 2007 to the Fourth Circuit (blue slipped by Republican Sen. John Warner and Democratic Sen. James Webb)
  • U.S. District Judge Gene Pratter – nominated in 2007 to the Third Circuit (blue slipped by Democratic Sen. Bob Casey)
  • Rod Rosenstein – nominated in 2007 to the Fourth Circuit (blue slipped by Democratic Sens. Barbara Mikulski and Ben Cardin)
  • U.S. District Judge William Smith – nominated in 2007 to the First Circuit (blue slipped by Democratic Sens. Jack Reed and Sheldon Whitehouse)

Looking at the numbers, fifteen Democratic appellate nominees were blocked by home-state senatorial courtesy, while seven Republican appellate nominees were similarly blocked.  While all of the Democratic blocked nominees were blocked by Republican home-state senators, only five of the seven Republican nominees were blocked by Democrats (one was blocked by a Republican senators, while another was blocked jointly by home-state senators of both parties).

In other words, Republican home-state senators have blocked appellate nominees approximately twice as often than Democratic senators.  As such, Grassley is giving up a privilege used far more frequently by senators of his party.

However, the bigger issue with Grassley’s decision is apparent when looking at the nominees senators have returned blue slips on.  During both the Clinton and Obama Administrations, Republicans have used blue slips to demand nominees with conservative records or connections in their home states.  In many cases, Democratic Administrations have acquiesced, choosing clerks for Republican appointees and state and federal judges nominated by Republicans.  In other cases, Democratic Administrations have chosen older judges with little likelihood of Supreme Court elevation or long tenures, foregoing building a bench of younger liberals.  In contrast, Democrats have not made similar demands, largely allowing Republican presidents to shape the courts of appeals in their states and returning blue slips on most nominees.  Consider the following:

During the Clinton Administration, 66 appellate nominees were confirmed.  Of these, 35 were from states requiring blue-slips from Republican senators.  Of these 35…

  • Five were District Court Judges originally nominated by Republican Presidents: Judges Fred Parker, Marcus, Traxler, Sotomayor, & Williams.
  • Four were District Court Judges nominated by Democratic Presidents but with strongly conservative records on the trial court: Judges Cabranes, Murphy, Hull, & Rendell.
  • Two were directly recommended by Republican senators: Judges Silverman & Tallman.
  • Nine were over the age of 55 at the time of their nomination: Judges Leval, Robert Manley Parker, Murphy, Fred Parker, Gilman, Lipez, Straub, Pooler, & Sack.

In other words, approximately half of Clinton’s nominees in states with Republican home-state senators had close ties to Republicans, conservative records, or were older nominees with less time on the bench.

Similarly, during the Obama Administration, 55 appellate nominees were confirmed.  Of these, 26 were from states with Republican home-state senators.  Of these 26…

  • Two were District Court Judges originally nominated by Republican Presidents: Judges Floyd & Carnes.
  • Three were State Court Judges/Officials nominated by Republican Governors: Judge Christen, Phillips, & McHugh.
  • One was recommended by Republican senators: Judge Higginson.
  • Four clerked for Republican appointees at the Supreme Court: Judges Jordan, Hurwitz, Costa, and Krause.
  • Two had otherwise close relationships with home-state Republican senators: Judges Martin, & Matheson.
  • Ten were over the age of 55 at the time of their nomination: Judges Wynn, Stranch, Matheson, Graves, Donald, Floyd, Hurwitz, Kayatta, McHugh, and Restrepo.

In other words, about two-thirds of Obama’s nominees in states with Republican senators had Republican connections, conservative reputations, or were older nominees with less time on the bench.

This is in sharp contrast with the Bush Administration, during which 62 appellate judges were confirmed.  Of these, 31 were in states that had Democratic home-state senators.  Of these 31:

  • Just one was a District Court Judge appointed by a Democratic President: Judge Barrington Daniels Parker.
  • None clerked for Democratic appointees on the Supreme Court (although one, Judge Chertoff clerked for Justice William Brennan, a Democrat nominated by Republican President Eisenhower).
  • One was recommended by a Democratic senator: Judge Helene White.
  • Four were over the age of 55 at the time of their nomination: Judges Bea, Hall, McKeague, & M.D. Smith.

In other words, only about one in four Bush appointees in seats with Democratic blue slips had Democratic connections, liberal records, or were older judges with less time on the bench.

What does this mean overall?  Basically, Republican senators have leveraged home-state senatorial courtesy to keep younger liberals off the bench.  Their success has ensured that judicial debate at the appellate levels takes place between young conservative judges and older, moderate to liberal judges.  In strictly enforcing blue slips for circuit court appointments, former Chairman Leahy allowed this pattern to continue through the Obama Administration.  Had Grassley maintained the blue slip on his end, he could have maintained this assymetrical advantage.

However, by announcing that he would disregard the blue slip in special circumstances, Grassley has opened the door to allow a bold Democratic President the chance to reshape the bench with young liberals.  In their zeal to add Justice Stras to the bench this year, Republicans have given away their most powerful weapon for preserving the conservative tilt of the federal bench.

 

Bending Blue Slips: What was the Need?

For those few who haven’t heard, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley announced yesterday that, contrary to previous statements, he is moving forward with hearings on two appellate judges who did not have positive blue slips from both home state senators: Justice David Stras for the Eighth Circuit; and Stuart Kyle Duncan to the Fifth Circuit (whom Republican home-state senator John Kennedy has not yet committed to supporting).

Let’s set aside the merits of Grassley’s new “case-by-case” blue slip policy.  You can make arguments on either side.

Let’s also side Grassley’s hypocrisy in setting aside a policy he strictly abided by when it hurt a Democratic President, blocking numerous well-qualified appellate nominees, including:

  • Former Indiana Supreme Court Justice Myra Selby
  • U.S. District Court Judge Abdul Kallon
  • Appellate Head at the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Pennsylvania Rebecca Ross Haywood
  • Kentucky Supreme Court Justice Lisabeth Hughes

Let’s instead focus on what I keep asking myself about Grassley’s announcement:

What was the Need?

I have yet to find the masses of Trump appellate nominees being blocked by blue slips.  Out of the eighteen appellate nominees put forward by the Trump Administration, only three have not had both blue slips returned: Stras, Michael Brennan for the Seventh Circuit; and Ryan Bounds to the Ninth Circuit.  In fact, of the eleven Democratic senators with an opportunity to return blue slips on appellate nominees, seven have done so.  As Grassley’s staff itself stated a month ago, there is no issue with Democratic senators not returning their blue slips.  So, why the urgency?

Now, it may be possible that many prospective Trump nominees are being blocked pre-nomination by the intransigency of home-state senators.  But, in his statement justifying his actions, Grassley made no mention of this.  Instead, his focus was on the nominations already made, a measure by which Trump is already doing far better than his predecessors.

I hypothesize that Grassley’s announcement has less to do with the level of obstruction and more to do with the current political climate.  With the GOP’s poor performance in the 2017 elections, and the recent revelations affecting the Alabama special election, Senate Republicans are suddenly facing the possibility that they may be in the minority after the 2018 elections.  Facing a shorter window to confirm judges, Grassley may have felt the pressure to move as many as possible.

At any rate, Grassley’s move, whether principled or politically motivated, was strategically misguided, as I will discuss in the companion piece to this post.

 

Prof. Stephanos Bibas – Nominee to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

The Trump Administration has nominated many academics and former academics to the bench.  Yet, even among them, no one is as prolific as Stephanos Bibas.  Bibas, a professor of law and criminology at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, enters the confirmation process as one of the nation’s foremost experts in criminal law and procedure.  If confirmed, he stands ready to shape a new era of criminal jurisprudence, with an increased focus on the morality of punishment and the rights of victims.

Background

Stephanos Bibas was born in New York City in 1969 in a Greek-American family.  While spending summers working in his family’s restaurant, Bibas graduated high school early and entered Columbia University at 16.[1]  At Columbia, Bibas became involved with Parliamentary Debate, and began to explore a career in law.[2]  Bibas graduated summa cum laude from Columbia in 1989 with a B.A. in political theory.

After graduating from Columbia, Bibas attended Oxford University, receiving a B.A. and M.A. in jurisprudence.  While at Oxford, Bibas participated in the 1991 World Debate Championships in Toronto, being awarded the title of 1st Place Speaker.[3]  Bibas then attended Yale Law School, graduating with a J.D. in 1994.

After graduation, and a clerkship with Judge Patrick Higginbotham on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Bibas joined Covington & Burling as a litigation associate.  In 1997, Bibas secured a prestigious clerkship with Justice Anthony Kennedy, clerking on the Supreme Court alongside future appellate judges Raymond Kethledge,[4] John Owens,[5] and Sri Srinivasan.[6]

After his Supreme Court clerkship, Bibas was hired as a federal prosecutor by Mary Jo White, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York.  In 2000, he left that position to join Yale Law School at a research fellow.[7]  In 2001, Bibas joined the faculty of the University of Iowa College of Law, teaching criminal law and criminal procedure.

In 2006, Bibas moved from the University of Iowa to the University of Pennsylvania Law School as a Professor of Law.  Bibas took on a secondary appointment as a Professor of Criminology in 2009.  He currently serves in both capacities.

History of the Seat

Bibas has been nominated for a Pennsylvania seat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated by Judge Marjorie Rendell.  Rendell, a Democrat who was appointed by President Bill Clinton, moved to senior status on July 1, 2015.[8]  On March 15, 2016, President Obama nominated Rebecca Ross Haywood, the Appellate Chief of the Civil Division of the United States Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Pennsylvania, to fill the vacancy.[9]  However, Haywood was opposed by Sen. Patrick Toomey (R-PA) who refused to return a blue slip on her nomination.[10]  Without the blue slip, Haywood did not receive a hearing, and her nomination died at the end of the 114th Congress.

After his election, President Trump declined to renominate Haywood, instead nominating Bibas to the seat on June 7, 2017.

Political Activity

Bibas has made a few political donations in his lifetime, all to Republicans.  In 1996, Bibas donated $250 to the Presidential Campaign of Bob Dole.[11]  Similarly, in 2012, he gave $2500 to the Presidential Campaign of Mitt Romney, as well as $1000 to Romney’s Political Action Committee (PAC), Restore Our Future.[12]  Additionally, Bibas has given $1500 to Sen. Pat Toomey’s PAC, Citizens for Prosperity in America.[13]

Legal Experience

While Bibas has spent most of his legal career in academia, he has practiced law for two short periods: 1995-97, when he was a litigation associate at Covington & Burling; and 1998-2000, when he was a federal prosecutor with the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York.  Additionally, Bibas has represented clients through his work at the University of Pennsylvania Supreme Court clinic.

As a litigation associate at Covington & Burling, Bibas handled a variety of cases, including representing a pro bono plaintiff in an employment discrimination trial and appeal in D.C. federal court.[14]  As a federal prosecutor, Bibas notably prosecuted Alastair Duncan, a dealer charged with conspiracy for stealing Tiffany Glass from mausoleums.[15]

More controversially, in 1999, Bibas led the aggressive prosecution of a cashier at the Veterans’ Affair Medical Center in the Bronx.[16]  The cashier in question, Linda Williams, lost her job and faced a misdemeanor charge (later dropped to a citation) for allegedly pocketing $7.00 given to her by a customer.[17]  Bibas led an aggressive prosecution, calling five government witnesses (none of whom had actually seen the entire transaction that Williams was charged with pilfering).[18]  Despite one of the government witnesses testifying that the missing money was later found in Williams’ cash register, Bibas pushed for a guilty verdict, stating in his closing that Williams “is guilty and she knows it.”[19]  Judge Douglas Eaton was unimpressed and acquitted Williams from the bench after Bibas’ closing.  Bibas’ conduct during the Williams trial has already drawn criticism from Alliance for Justice, a liberal-leaning nonprofit group.[20]

As a law professor at the University of Pennsylvania, Bibas also runs the Law School’s Supreme Court clinic.  In this capacity, Bibas has argued six cases before the U.S. Supreme Court:

Turner v. Rogers[21] – This case involved a challenge to civil contempt charges in a child support proceeding.  Turner challenged South Carolina’s refusal to provide him with counsel during a civil contempt proceeding, even though he faced the risk of incarceration.  Bibas represented Rebecca Rogers, the mother in the underlying child support action, and argued that, as Turner had already served the contempt sentence, the case was moot.  The Supreme Court unanimously disagreed with Bibas, finding that the case was not moot.  Furthermore, a five-justice majority found, in an opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer, that South Carolina needed to provide safeguards against the erroneous deprivation of liberty in civil contempt cases.

Tapia v. United States[22] – Tapia, convicted of bail jumping and bringing illegal aliens into the United States, was sentenced to a 51-month sentence, in part, to permit Tapia to take part in drug rehabilitation while incarcerated.  Tapia challenged her extended sentence, arguing that a judge could not lengthen a sentence for a rehabilitative goal.  With the United States declining to defend the sentence, Bibas was appointed as amicus to do so.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Elena Kagan, found that Tapia’s sentence violated the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.

Vartelas v. Holder[23] – In this case, Bibas represented Vartelas, an immigrant who had been convicted of conspiracy to make or possess a counterfeit security in 1994.  In 2003, Vartelas visited Greece for a week and was denied re-entry based on his 1994 conviction.  Representing Vartelas, Bibas argued that the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, which was passed after Vartelas’ conviction and barred his re-entry, could not be retroactively applied against convictions of record before the law’s passage.  In a 6-3 opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Supreme Court agreed.

Petrella v. MGM, Inc.[24] – This case involved a copyright claim filed over the movie Raging Bull.  Bibas represented the plaintiffs in the case who sought to overcome the defense of “laches” against their copyright claim.  In an opinion by Ginsburg, a six-justice majority agreed with Bibas that laches did not bar the copyright claim in this case.

Bank of America v. Caulkett[25] – In this case, Bibas represented debtors who had taken out second mortgages on an already underwater property, and sought to avoid foreclosure.  In an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas, a unanimous Supreme Court rejected Bibas’ arguments and found that debtors could not void junior mortgages where senior mortgages on the same property were underwater.

Encino Motorcars, LLC. v. Navarro, et al.[26] – In this case, Bibas represented a group of “service advisors” at a car dealership who sought overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act.  While the Department of Labor had held that service advisors were exempt from overtime protections in 1987, it reversed its position in 2011.  The Supreme Court found, in a 6-2 opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy, that the Labor Department’s new position should not be according controlling weight in determining whether overtime should be offered.

Scholarship

Summarizing Bibas’ scholarship is not an easy task.  Not only is he a thought leader on issues of criminal law, he is also one of the most prolific academics to be nominated for the bench.[27]  Below are summaries of his writings, organized by general topic.

Habeas Corpus

One of Bibas’ earliest writings is a “Letter to the Editor” that he authored as an associate at Covington & Burling.  In the Letter, written in response to an editorial opposing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Bibas argues that the writ of habeas corpus should be significantly limited.[28]  Specifically, Bibas notes that habeas was originally limited to those held by military police and was not available in civilian courts.  Bibas goes on to argue that “there is no reason to allow prisoners who make no claim that they are innocent to hog the justice system at the expense of law-abiding citizens.”[29]

Bibas’ letter sparked a response from Boston University Law School Prof. Larry Yackle, who disagreed with Bibas’ historical analysis, noting:

“[S]tate convictions have been subject to re-examination in Federal court virtually since the founding of the Republic.”[30]

Yackle’s letter also calls out Bibas by name, accusing him of thinking that “Federal court enforcement of the Bill of Rights is a bad idea.”[31]

Plea Bargaining

Bibas is a strong advocate of reforming the current plea bargaining system, arguing that plea bargaining, as it currently exists, fails to protect defendants’ rights, while simultaneously failing to impose adequate punishment on the guilty.

In particular, Bibas is a strong critic of Alford or nolo contendre pleas (plea deals that allow the defendant to avoid admitting guilt).  In a 2003 article, Bibas argued for the abolishment of Alford pleas, arguing that they detract from the moral clarity that should be the main feature of the criminal sentencing process.  Bibas notes that Alford pleas “undermine the procedural values of accuracy and public confidence in accuracy and fairness by convicting innocent defendants and creating the perception that innocent defendants are being pressured into pleading guilty.”[32]  Bibas also argues that Alford pleas “allow guilty defendants to avoid accepting responsibility for their wrongs” and “muddy the criminal law’s moral message.”[33]  In another article, Bibas argues that the public will lose confidence in a criminal justice system that uses Alford pleas to convict the innocent.[34]  Elsewhere, Bibas notes that “most defendants who balk at accepting guilt are not innocent, but guilty criminals in denial” and that Alford pleas “harm not only offenders’ rehabilitation, but also victims’ healing.”[35]

Furthermore, Bibas has advocated for a more general reform of the plea bargain process, noting that the current process often has outcomes dependant on the quality of counsel, with poorer defendants often being stuck with inept attorneys.[36]  He also notes that courts have stopped relying more heavily on trials and “unequivocal” guilty pleas.[37]  As such, Bibas endorses a “consumer protection” model of regulating plea bargains, allowing defendants some protections against bad advice from defense counsel.[38]

Apprendi

In 2000, the Supreme Court ruled in Apprendi v. New Jersey that any facts used to enhance a defendant’s sentence beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.[39]  Bibas has been critical of Apprendi since the decision came out, arguing that requiring enhancing facts to be proven by a jury puts defendants in an impossible position: plead guilty and give up the right to a jury determination of enhancement; or go to trial and risk enhanced trial penalties.[40]  Furthermore, Bibas argues that, by removing sentencing power from judges, Apprendi empowers prosecutors to “charge bargain.”[41]

In 2004, the Supreme Court applied and reaffirmed Apprendi in Blakely v. Washington.[42]  Bibas wrote in response that Blakely would lead to the invalidation of the Sentencing Guidelines, and that, while this would benefit defendants “who could afford first-rate lawyers,” it would also increase “arbitrariness, disparity, and variations in sentences.”[43]  After the Supreme Court struck down the mandatory sentencing guidelines in United States v. Booker,[44] Bibas once again criticized the decision, noting that it undercuts Congress’ desire to punish white collar criminals harshly, and would lead to more leniency by judges in their sentencing.[45]  Specifically, Bibas notes that, if left up to the discretion of judges, “sentencing judges may be indulging unconscious racial and class stereotypes by going easy on defendants who remind judges of themselves or with whom judges can identify.”[46]

Fifth Amendment

Bibas is also strongly critical of the Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona and the “right to remain silent” framework it set up.  In response to an article praising the right to remain silent, Bibas notes that many guilty defendants do not remain silent, and instead choose to confess or lie and make up an alibi.  Remaining silent is often treated as evidence of guilt by police and investigators, and, with the prominence of plea bargaining, their inferences may matter more than those of juries.[47]  As such, there is a strong incentive for defendants, guilty or innocent, to co-operate with the police.[48]  In another article, Bibas argues that Miranda failed to adequately regulate coercive police interrogations, and criticizes the Rehnquist Court for failing to overturn Miranda in its decision in United States v. Dickerson.[49]

Gideon and Right to Counsel

Bibas has also written about the right to counsel, as guaranteed by the Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright.  Specifically, Bibas argues that Gideon has spread the resources of lawyers too thin, thus diluting their effectiveness in capital cases.[50]  Furthermore, Bibas argues that the bar for effectiveness of lawyers is set too low, and as such, “many defendants have lawyers in name only.”[51]  Bibas also attacks the Strickland test for determining effectiveness of counsel, arguing that courts have a “hindsight bias” that prevents them from finding prejudice in cases with ineffective attorneys.[52]

Prosecutorial Regulation

A former prosecutor himself, Bibas has written extensively on prosecutorial discretion, and reform of prosecutorial incentives.  In one paper, Bibas advocates for the use of compensation to encourage prosecutors to model appropriate conduct.  For example, Bibas notes:

“A prosecutor who regularly burns the midnight oil deserves to be paid more than one who who leaves the office every day at 5 p.m.”[53]

Bibas also advocates an evaluation model to encourage judges, defense attorneys, and the public to provide feedback of prosecutors’ work, and to base compensation on such feedback.[54]  Bibas has also advocated reforming the culture in prosecutor’s offices to encourage self-regulation.[55]  Interestingly, Bibas cites the New Orleans District Attorney’s Office under the leadership of Harry Connick Sr. as an example of self-regulation by prosecutors, noting:

“The New Orleans District Attorney’s Office used centralized screening, close supervisory review, and information technology to restrict overcharging and plea bargaining.  By doing so, District Attorney Harry Connick, Sr. fulfilled his campaign pledge to crack down on plea bargaining.”[56]

Bibas fails to note that Connick and the New Orleans D.A.’s Office have come under repeated scrutiny for failing to disclose relevant exculpatory evidence,[57] and using prosecutorial power to intimidate defense witnesses.[58]

Sentencing Reform

Most academics and attorneys who discuss sentencing reform focus on mandatory minimum sentences or overly harsh sentencing laws.  In contrast, Bibas has been a strong advocate for more unorthodox sentencing procedures.  For example, in 2004, Bibas co-authored a paper expressing the need for “remorse and apology” in the sentencing process.[59]  Specifically, Bibas argued that courts at sentencing should use defendant’s conduct at trial, during pleas, and in mediation with the victim to tailor the sentence based on the level of remorse and apology demonstrated.[60]  In another paper, Bibas also encourages the incorporation of mercy and forgiveness, through greater victim involvement, in the criminal justice system.[61]

Originalism

Unlike other academics with Federalist Society backgrounds, Bibas is not an advocate of originalism.  Instead, Bibas argues that, while originalism can be helpful, in many cases, historical evidence is unclear and cannot be the foundation for workable rules.[62]  For example, Bibas notes that originalism contradicts long-held doctrines such as the exclusionary rule.[63]  Further, he argues that many of the defendant-friendly doctrines brought about by an originalist interpretation, including a strict interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, do not take into account evolving views in the law during the 18th Century.[64]  Adopting an originalist framework on the Confrontation Clause, Bibas notes, “freezes in place a snapshot of law that was changing in the late eighteenth century.”[65]  Furthermore, Bibas notes that historical propositions cannot be analogized to all present day situations:

“…today’s issues do not involve the same set of considerations that concerned the Framers.”[66]

Overall Assessment

Some may describe Bibas as a solid conservative.  His writings demonstrate a deep interest with the moral element of crime and punishment, focusing on a belief that the criminal justice system can and should identify and punish “morally wrong” actors.  Furthermore, his aggressive (and politically unwise) prosecution of a popular cashier over $7 in cash makes it easy to caricature Bibas as a modern-day Javert.

At the same time, Bibas’ criticisms of the current criminal justice system are based not only on its failure towards victims, but also towards defendants.  His writings show a strong concern with ensuring that defendants receive adequate representation, and that constitutional protections are not limited to the small fraction of defendants who go to trial, but extend to the vast majority who plead their cases.  As such, others can argue that Bibas holds more moderate-liberal views.

This combination makes Bibas’ ideology hard to pin down.  Rather, Bibas’ most apparent characteristic is his willingness to challenge traditional thought on criminal law and jurisprudence.  From demanding the greater involvement of remorse in the sentencing process, to the advocacy of offering prosecutors financial incentives to perform well, Bibas is definitely an outside-the-box thinker.

If there is a jurist that Bibas looks likely to model, it is recently-retired Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner.  Like Bibas, Posner was a brilliant path-breaking academic when he was tapped to the federal bench.  On the bench, Posner was notoriously unpredictable, with little ideological commitment, but a deep concern nonetheless for the practical application of decisions, famously noting:

“A case is just a dispute. The first thing you do is ask yourself – forget about the law – what is a sensible resolution of this dispute?”

Bibas’ own concern about the practical effect of the Supreme Court’s criminal decisions, especially their effects both for defendants and victims, can be described as Posnerian.  It is up to the Senate Judiciary Committee to determine if that is a quality to be encouraged on the federal bench.


[1] See Steven Bibas, Letter to the Editor, Early Entry to College Demands Maturity, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1989, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/03/12/opinion/l-early-entry-to-college-demands-maturity-885089.html.

[2] Stephanos Bibas, CrimProf Blog Professor Spotlight: Stephanos Bibas, CrimProf Blog, Nov. 27, 2004, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/crimprof_blog/2004/11/profesor_spotli.html.

[3] See id.

[4] Kethledge also clerked for Justice Kennedy.

[5] Owens clerked for Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

[6] Srinivasan clerked for Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.

[7] See Bibas, supra n. 2

[8] Jeremy Roebuck, Judge Rendell to Take On ‘Senior Status’, Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 31, 2015, http://www.philly.com/philly/news/politics/20150131_3rd_Circuit_Judge_Rendell_to_take_on__quot_senior_status_quot_.html.

[9] Obama Nominates McKeesport Native to Federal Bench, Pittsburgh Action News 4, Mar. 15, 2016, http://www.wtae.com/article/obama-nominates-mckeesport-native-to-federal-bench/7478509.

[10] Jonathan Tamari and Jeremy Roebuck, Obama’s Pick for Judgeship Here Draws Toomey’s Ire, Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar. 15, 2016, http://www.philly.com/philly/news/politics/20160316_Obama_nominates_Pittsburgh_federal_prosecutor_for_Third_Circuit_vacancy.html.

[11] Center for Responsive Politics, https://www.opensecrets.org/donor-lookup/results?name=stephanos+bibas (last visited Sept. 27, 2017).

[12] See id.

[13] Id.

[14] See Prof. Stephanos Bibas, Curriculum Vitae, https://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/sbibas/cv.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2017).

[15] See Greg B. Smith, Robber’s Ghoulish Tale Sold Cemetery Treasure to Art Pro, N.Y. Daily News, Aug. 4, 1999, http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/robber-ghoulish-tale-sold-cemetery-treasure-art-pro-article-1.849599.  

[16] Benjamin Weiser, A Federal Case of Small Change; U.S. Prosecutes a Hospital Cashier Over $7 and Loses, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/06/nyregion/a-federal-case-of-small-change-us-prosecutes-a-hospital-cashier-over-7-and-loses.html?mcubz=1.  

[17] Id.

[18] See id.

[19] Id. (quoting Stephanos Bibas).

[21] 564 U.S. 431 (2011).

[22] 564 U.S. 319 (2011).

[23] 132 S. Ct. 1479 (2011).

[24] 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2013).

[25] 135 S. Ct. 1995 (2015).

[26] 136 S. Ct. 1538 (2016).

[27] Jonathan Adler, Professor Bibas Writes Letters (and Lots of Articles Too), Wash. Post, June 13, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/13/professor-bibas-writes-letters-and-lots-of-articles-too/?utm_term=.1a5e03bafa9d.  

[28] Stephanos Bibas, Framers Never Intended Habeas Corpus As We Know It, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1996.  

[29] Id.

[30] Larry Yackle, History of Habeas Corpus Didn’t Begin With 20th Century, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1996.

[31] Id.

[32] Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive Criminal Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendre Pleas, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1361, 1364 (July 2003).  

[33] Id. 

[34] Stephanos Bibas, Bringing Moral Values Into a Flawed Plea Bargaining System, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1425 (July 2003).  

[35] Stephanos Bibas, Exacerbating Injustice, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNnumbra 53, 55-56 (2008).  

[36] Stephanos Bibas,Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2463, 2481-82 (June 2004).  

[37] See Bibas, n. 33 at 56.

[38]Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 Calif. L. Rev. 1117, 1152 (August 2011) (“What defendants need is more robust consumer protection, much like the laws that regulate consumer contracts.”).  

[39] Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

[40] Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 Yale L.J. 1097 (May 2001).  

[41] Stephanos Bibas, Symposium: Legal Issues and Sociolegal Consequences of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: How Apprendi Affects Institutional Allocations of Power, 87 Iowa L. Rev. 465, 470-74 (January 2002).

[42] Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).

[43] Stephanos Bibas, Blakely’s Federal Aftermath, 16 Fed. Sent. R. 333, 350 (June 2004).

[44] United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

[45] Stephanos Bibas, White Collar Plea Bargaining and Sentencing After Booker, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 721 (December 2005).

[46] See id. at 724.

[47] Stephanos Bibas, The Right to Remain Silent Helps Only the Guilty, 88 Iowa L. Rev. 421, 424-28 (January 2003).

[48]See id.

[49] Stephanos Bibas, The Rehnquist Court’s Fifth Amendment Incrementalism, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1078 (August 2006).

[50]  Stephanos Bibas, Gideon at 50: Reassessing the Right to Counsel: Panel 4: The Future of the Right to Counsel: Shrinking Gideon and Expanding Alternatives to Lawyers, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1287 (Spring 2013).

[51] Id. at 1288.

[52]  Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hind-sight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 2004 Utah L. Rev. 1 (2004).

[53] Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Discretion: Rewarding Prosecutors for Performance, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 441, 443 (Spring 2009).

[54] Id. at 447.

[55] Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev, 959 (April 2009).  

[56] Id. at 1004.

[57] The Editorial Board, Justice Gone Wrong in New Orleans, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/20/opinion/justice-gone-wrong-in-new-orleans.html?mcubz=1.

[58] Radley Balko, New Orleans’ Persistent Prosecutor Problem, Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/10/27/new-orleanss-persistent-prosecutor-problem/?utm_term=.b276413d45b6.  

[59]  Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Biershbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 Yale L.J. 85 (October 2004).

[60] Id. at 144-45.

[61] Stephanos Bibas, Mercy and Clemency: Forgiveness in Criminal Procedure, 4 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 329 (Spring 2007).  

[62] Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 Geo. L.J. 183 (Nov. 2005).  

[63] Stephanos Bibas, Originalism in Criminal Procedure: Ancient Checks or Newfangled Rights?: Two Cheers, Not Three, for Sixth Amendment Originalism, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 45, 46 (Winter 2011).

[64] Id. at 51.

[65] Id.

[66] Id. 

Nominations – Sept. 28, 2017

Today, the White House announced nine new judicial nominations (seven to lifetime appointments).  The new nominees are:

Barry Ashe, a New Orleans based civil litigator, has been nominated to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Daniel Domenico, the former Solicitor General of Colorado, has been nominated to the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado.

Stuart Kyle Duncan, an appellate attorney and former counsel for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, has been nominated to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Judge Kurt Engelhardt, a federal district judge appointed by President George W. Bush, has been nominated to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

James Ho, a partner in the Dallas Office of Gibson Dunn, and the former Solicitor General of Texas, has been nominated to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Ryan T Holte, a professor at the University of Akron School of Law, has been nominated to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims.

Gregory E. Maggs, the Arthur Selwyn Miller Research Professor of Law at the George Washington University Law School, has been nominated to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. (Full disclosure, Maggs taught me in law school, wrote several of my clerkship recommendations, and remains a mentor.)

Howard Nielson, a former Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Department of Justice, has been nominated to the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah.

Justice Don Willett, currently serving on the Texas Supreme Court, has been nominated to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

 

Stephen S. Schwartz – Nominee to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims

Two months ago, I wrote on Damien Schiff, a nominee for the Court of Federal Claims (CFC).  Specifically, I called out Schiff’s youth, noting that he was only 38, and had spent less than thirteen years in practice.  Steven S. Schwartz, Trump’s second nominee for the CFC, has even less experience, having been out of law school for less than ten years.  

Background

Stephen S. Schwartz received a B.A. with Distinction from Yale University in 2005, and immediately proceeded to the University of Chicago Law School, graduating with a J.D. in 2008.[1]  After graduating, Schwartz clerked for conservative Judge Jerry Edwin Smith on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

After his clerkship, Schwartz joined the Washington D.C. Office of Kirkland and Ellis as a litigation associate.  After five years there, Schwartz was hired as Counsel at Cause of Action, a public interest law firm focused on FOIA and administrative law suits against the federal government.  

In November 2016, Schwartz left Cause of Action to become a partner at Schaerr Duncan LLP., a D.C> Boutique Litigation firm, that, among other matters, represented Sen. Ted Cruz in the challenge to his eligibility to run for president.  

History of the Seat

Schwartz has been nominated for a seat on the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (CFC), an Article I court that hears monetary claims against the federal government.  Judges are appointed for 15-year terms.  The seat Schiff was nominated for opened up on October 21, 2013, with Judge Lynn Bush’s move to senior status.  On April 10, 2014, Thomas Halkowski, a Principal in the Delaware office of Fish & Richardson, P.C. was nominated for the vacancy by President Obama.[2]  Halkowski and four other nominees to the Court were approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee unanimously.  However, the nominations were blocked by Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AR), who argued that the CFC did not need any more judges.[3]  Despite rebuttals from federal claims attorneys and Chief Judge Patricia Campbell-Smith, Cotton maintained his blockade, and the Obama Administration was unable to fill any vacancies on the Court, leaving six of the sixteen judgeships vacant.[4]

Legal Experience

From 2009 to 2015, Schwartz served as a litigation associate at Kirkland & Ellis.  In this capacity, Schwartz represented large companies in trials and appeals in federal court.  For example, Schwartz was part of the legal team for UBS Securities LLC in a case involving alleged violations of the Georgia Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.[5]  Schwartz also joined noted advocate Christopher Landau in an unsuccessful appeal of a jury award against Avis Budget Group Inc.[6]

In 2015, Schwartz moved to Cause of Action, challenging agency determinations that he considered abuses of discretion. During the transition, Schwartz was part of the legal team challenging FDA interpretations of exclusivity rights on behalf of pharmaceutical companies.[7]  He also represented a franchise charged with wage and hour violations by the Department of Labor.[8]

Overall Assessment

Like Damien Schiff before him, Schwartz comes from a background of legal resistance to agency determinations.  However, unlike Schiff, Schwartz does not have a long record of inflammatory blog posts.  As such, it is unlikely that Schwartz’s nomination will attract the same intensity of opposition that Schiff has.  If opposition gathers, it will be based on his youth and inexperience, rather than his political opinions.


[2] Press Release, White House, Presidential Nominations Sent to the Senate (May 14, 2014) (on file at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office).

[3] Jordain Carney, Cotton Blocks Senate From Approving Federal Claims Judges, The Hill, July 14, 2015, http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/247934-cotton-blocks-senate-from-approving-federal-claims-judges.

[4] Daniel Wilson, Claims Court a Quiet Victim of Senate Nomination Deadlock, Law360, July 18, 2016, https://www.law360.com/articles/817931/claims-court-a-quiet-victim-of-senate-nomination-deadlock.

[5] See Raser Tech. Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189209 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 30, 2012).

[6] Alaska Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Avis Budget Group, Inc., 709 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2013).

[7] Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. United States Food & Drug Admin., 23 F. Supp. 3d 631 (N.D.W.V. 2014), rev’d, 594 Fed. Appx. 791 (4th Cir. 2014).  

[8] Rhea Lana, Inc. & Rhea Lana’s Franchise Systems Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor, 824 F.3d 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2016).